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Abstract
Animals often aid others without gaining any immediate benefits. Al-
though these acts seem to reduce the donor’s fitness, they are only 
apparently altruistic. Donors typically help because they or their kin 
receive future benefits or avoid costly punishment. Reciprocal altru-
ism—alternating the roles of donor and recipient—has been a well-
studied form of cooperation among non-kin because of its intuitive 
appeal in explaining human cooperation. Despite immense theoreti-
cal interest, little empirical evidence substantiates the biological im-
portance of reciprocal altruism in non-human animals. We propose 
that this is because psychological mechanisms constrain its applica-
tion in cooperative contexts. In particular, we contend that cogni-
tive limitations such as temporal discounting, numerical discrimina-
tion and memory make reciprocity difficult for animals.
Why be nice if you can benefit by being selfish? An-swer: cooperation sometimes pays off. Numerous 
species cooperate in contexts such as foraging, mate attrac-
tion, predator avoidance, territory defense and parental 
care [1]. Among humans, in particular, cooperation seems 
to have been elevated to an integral part of society. Defin-
ing cooperation in economic terms—joint action for mutual 
benefit [1, 2]—allows us to assess how costs and benefits, in 
terms of evolutionary fitness, influence the circumstances 
under which cooperation exists. For instance, in situations 
in which individuals gain immediate benefits by cooperat-
ing, cooperation is “selfish.” Selfish cooperation, or mutu-
alism [3], occurs when cooperators receive immediate, self-
ish benefits. Selfish cooperation is quite common in animal 
societies, particularly in cooperative hunting situations [4].
When cooperation is “altruistic”—costly to the coop-
erator and beneficial to the recipient—the temptation to 
cheat is high because defection (not cooperating) provides 
immediate benefits. So why help another at a cost to your-
self? The simple answer is that what appears to be altru-
istic cooperation is only costly in the short term. Altruis-
tic cooperators gain selfish benefits either by helping kin 
or by recouping their losses in future interactions. To ac-
crue these selfish benefits, altruistic cooperators must use 
“conditional strategies” such as interacting only with rel-
atives (kin selection) [5], interacting only with those that 
have cooperated previously (reciprocal altruism) [6], or 
receiving threats of sanctions (harassment or punishment) 
(see Box 1; [7, 8]).
In this article we focus on a form of altruistic coopera-
tion with interesting psychological implications: reciprocal 
altruism (or reciprocity)—the alternation of donor and re-
cipient roles in repeated altruistic interactions. When Triv-
ers [6] introduced the concept of reciprocal altruism, he 
outlined necessary prerequisites, such as: (i) a large ben-
efit to the recipient and a small cost to the donor; (ii) re-
peated opportunities for cooperative interaction; and (iii) 
the ability to detect cheaters. Instances of human coopera-
tion satisfy these requirements and demonstrate the preva-
lence of reciprocal altruism across different economic con-
texts [9, 10] and cultures [11]. Some argue that reciprocity 
is so integral to human society that we have evolved spe-
cialized cognitive mechanisms to facilitate its stability, in-
cluding the systematic detection and punishment of cheat-
ers (see Box 1; [12, 13]).
Given that reciprocity is common in humans and that 
the prerequisites appear trivial, should we expect to see 
it in non-human animals? We argue that the prerequisites 
for reciprocal altruism have been underestimated. A care-
ful dissection reveals a host of underlying mechanisms nec-
essary for both initiating a reciprocal relationship and for 
maintaining it over the long term. Some of the essential 
psychological ingredients for reciprocation include numer-
ical quantification, time estimation, delayed gratification, 
detection and punishment of cheaters, analysis and recall 
of reputation, and inhibitory control; depending on the na-
ture of the reciprocal interaction, some or all of these ca-
pacities may be necessary. If reciprocity is, indeed, as cog-
nitively complex as we suggest, then we must anchor our 
theoretical predictions about adaptive function in realistic 
constraints imposed by neural and psychological design 
features. Because of these limitations, we predict that recip-
rocal altruism will be rare among animals, and when it ap-
pears, will represent a relatively minor force in the evolu-
tion of social organizations.
Here we provide a brief discussion of the evidence for 
reciprocal altruism in animals, make the claim that it is 
rare, and then offer some suggestions for why it is rare. Be-
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cause the literature on reciprocity and its associated cogni-
tive mechanisms is vast, our intent is not to review it, but 
to pinpoint a few reasons why reciprocal altruism is rare in 
non-human animals and common in humans.
Reciprocal altruism: theoretical and empirical evidence
Following Trivers, the concept of reciprocity remained 
all but untouched until Axelrod and Hamilton [14] pre-
sented a possible reciprocal strategy that allows for stable 
cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario (see Box 2; 
[15]). Axelrod and Hamilton suggested that stable cooper-
ation can emerge if the cooperative interactions occur re-
peatedly, the opening move is cooperative, and from that 
point on, each player copies the other’s moves. This win-
ning strategy is a version of reciprocity called Tit-For-Tat 
(TFT). Several theoretical investigations confirmed the effi-
cacy of TFT, whereas others provided alternative strategies 
that could maintain cooperation (reviewed in [1]).
Several experimental and field studies of fish [16], vam-
pire bats [17], primates [18–20] and other species have re-
ported evidence of reciprocity. Although these studies el-
egantly show that there are naturally occurring contexts 
in which reciprocity might provide a solution to altruism 
among unrelated individuals, they are open to alternative 
explanations and several criticisms, including the fitness 
costs and benefits are ambiguous and the reciprocal events 
among non-kin are rare. Two laboratory experiments cir-
cumvent some of these criticisms by directly manipulating 
the costs and benefits of cooperation and controlling the 
partner’s behavior.
Stephens and colleagues placed blue jays (Cyanocitta 
cristata) in experimental games such as the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma in which pairs of birds peck keys to receive rewards 
[2, 21, 22]. Jays cooperated in these situations, but only in 
specialized circumstances, with no evidence of TFT-like 
strategies (Figure 1). Hauser and colleagues designed a se-
ries of experiments in which cotton-top tamarins (Sagui-
nus oedipus) could altruistically pull a tool to give food to 
an unrelated recipient without getting any food for them-
selves [23]. Tamarins pulled the tool most often for part-
ners that always pulled and infrequently for partners that 
never pulled (Figure 2). The tamarins, however, coop-
erated less than 50% of the time, and as each game pro-
gressed, the amount of food given dropped. Like jays, tam-
arins can maintain some level of cooperation under some 
restricted conditions. Overall all, however, neither species 
demonstrates robust reciprocity.
Box 1. Cheater detection and punishment
1. Cheater detection
An important requirement of reciprocity is the ability to detect 
cheaters. Although cheating appears to be rampant in animals [4], de-
tecting cheaters has not been well-studied. The case is different, how-
ever, for humans. Cosmides and Tooby [12] hypothesize that humans 
have specialized adaptations to assist in cheater detection. To test this 
they presented subjects with the Wason selection task—a simple test 
of logic in which subjects must determine whether the conditional rule 
“If p then q” has been violated. Cosmides and Tooby found that sub-
jects often failed when presented with a version of this logic problem 
that used abstract propositions (e.g. matching particular letters with 
particular numbers). By contrast, when given a social-contract version 
of the test (e.g. enforcing the drinking age), the subjects performed 
much more accurately. Given these differences in accuracy, Cosmides 
and Tooby propose that humans have specialized cognitive modules de-
voted to detecting cheaters.
One significant piece of support for this “cheater detection mod-
ule” hypothesis comes from a cognitive neuropsychological study [46]. 
In this study, a patient (R.M.) with severe bilateral damage to the orbi-
tofrontal cortex, the temporal cortex and the amygdala (areas associ-
ated with social intelligence) was tested in a series of social-contract 
and “precaution” problems. In comparison with non-damaged subjects 
and subjects with severe damage in other areas, R.M. performed less 
well in social-contract scenarios, but they all performed equally well in 
the precaution problems. Cosmides and Tooby interpret these data as 
evidence for specialized brain areas associated with social reasoning.
2. Punishment
Cheaters can be dealt with in two ways: retaliation and pun-
ishment. Retaliation is simply withholding future benefits from a 
cheater—that is, reciprocal defection, such as that found in TFT. An-
other way to manage cheating is to impose costs on defection by 
punishing cheaters. Clutton-Brock and Parker contend that punish-
ment is a common technique used by animals to enforce cooperation 
[7]. Although little new evidence has emerged to support this con-
tention, a related explanation—harassment—may explain some in-
stances of enforced cooperation in animals [8, 47]. In humans, how-
ever, there is a rich literature describing the use of punishment in 
cooperative situations [48–50]. Some economists and anthropol-
ogists suggest that humans might have evolved a different and ap-
parently unique form of cooperation called “strong reciprocity” [50]. 
This combination of reciprocity and punishment has been defined by 
Gintis and colleagues as a “predisposition to cooperate with others 
and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at per-
sonal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will 
be repaid either by others or at a later date” [49]. Proponents of this 
perspective argue that current models of human behavior that focus 
on self-interest cannot account for the frequency of human coopera-
tion. They propose that human societies can be characterized by the 
special circumstances necessary to maintain cooperation via group 
selection. Regardless of whether punishment is self- or group-inter-
ested, it is nevertheless quite common in human cooperative situa-
tions and noticeably less common in animal societies.
Box 2. Prisoner’s dilemma
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two individuals simultaneously choose 
one of two strategies: cooperate or defect. The resulting payoff de-
pends on both players’ choices (Table I). To qualify as a Prisoner’s Di-
lemma, the payoffs must conform to the following set of inequalities: 
T > R > P > S. Mutual cooperation results in a moderate reward (R), 
but mutual defection leads to low payoffs for both players (P). When 
one cooperates and the other defects, the defector receives the larg-
est possible reward (T) and the cooperator receives the smallest 
possible reward (S). This implies that mutual cooperation is better 
than mutual defection, but for an individual player, there is a sizable 
temptation to defect. Therefore, the evolutionarily stable strategy in 
a one-shot game is defection.
Table I. Payoff matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma. The row player re-
ceives payoffs R, T, P, or S, depending on whether the column player 
cooperates (C) or defects (D). The player that defects when its op-
ponent cooperates receives the maximum payoff of T fitness units 
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Why is reciprocity rare?
Given the theoretical feasibility and ubiquity of human 
reciprocity, why do we find little evidence of non-human 
animals reciprocating [24]? Perhaps researchers have not 
used the appropriate combination of species and method-
ology to find reciprocity. We find this explanation unsatis-
fying because cooperation has been investigated in a large 
number of species, including invertebrates, fish, birds and 
many mammal species [1]. Researchers have also used sev-
eral methodological techniques to investigate cooperation, 
ranging from observation to natural experiments to highly 
controlled laboratory experiments.
We propose that reciprocity is uncommon because it is 
too cognitively demanding for most, if not all, non-human 
animals. What started out as a simple solution to the prob-
lem of altruism among non-kin turns out to be much more 
challenging.
Cognitive constraints on cooperation
Cognitive abilities are clearly important in constrain-
ing animal behavior. To investigate how these constraints 
influence cooperation and reciprocity, we must break this 
problem down into its component parts. Here we examine 
a suite of cognitive abilities necessary to implement recip-
rocal strategies. There are likely to be constraints on time 
estimation, detection and punishment of cheaters, analy-
sis and recall of reputation, and inhibitory control, but here 
we focus on temporal discounting, numerical discrimina-
tion, learning and memory because they are well studied in 
human and non-human animals and have intuitive links to 
cooperation.
Temporal discounting
Temporal discounting is the devaluing of future re-
wards, which often results in a preference for smaller, im-
mediate rewards over larger, delayed rewards. For ex-
ample, imagine that a monkey encounters an unripe 
fruit—should it consume the fruit now or wait for it to 
ripen [25]? Waiting yields a larger benefit (more sugar 
available), but the future is uncertain—another monkey 
could eat it or a fungus might infest it, spoiling a perfectly 
good fruit. Uncertainties like these may have introduced a 
strong selective pressure to discount the future.
Given that the future is uncertain, should all organisms 
discount in the same way? Although discounting future 
rewards is probably universal among animals, the steep-
ness of the discounting function (or “discounting rate”) 
varies widely across species and contexts (Figure 3). A 
vast literature describes discounting in a broad range of 
species, using several different theoretical approaches, in-
cluding delayed gratification [26] and rate maximization 
[25]. The discounting rate, however, has only been esti-
mated for pigeons, rats, and humans [27–29]. Pigeons and 
rats both discount future rewards highly compared with 
humans (Figure 3).
Discounting is not necessarily a static parameter that ap-
plies to any choice situation. Rather, it can change choice 
preferences in different contexts. For example, in experi-
mental situations, blue jays have a strong preference for 
immediate rewards [30]. In the wild during autumn, how-
ever, jays switch from consuming every acorn they encoun-
ter to caching them behind tree bark or under leaf litter. 
This example of context-specific discounting is common 
across several bird and mammal species and exemplifies 
the ability of animals to overcome constraints in specific 
ecological conditions.
Figure 1. Stephens et al. [22] tested blue jays in experimental Prison-
er’s Dilemma situations and recorded the proportion of trials in which 
they cooperated. Pairs of jays played repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games 
by landing on perches associated with cooperation or defection. The 
number of pellets released into each bird’s food bin depended on the 
choices of both birds. In this particular experiment, food either accu-
mulated over a series of trials in the Plexiglas tubes (a), or was deliv-
ered immediately following a trial (b). In addition, a freely behaving bird 
played against a stooge that either always defected (shown in red) or 
played Tit-For-Tat (TFT, shown in blue). The jays only cooperated consis-
tently when food accumulated and they played against a TFT stooge, sug-
gesting that discounting and opponent strategy influenced cooperation. 
(Adapted from [22], courtesy of American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science).
Figure 2. In Hauser et al. [23], pairs of tamarins alternated the roles of 
donor and recipient in this game of altruism. The donor had access to a 
tool that when pulled distributed food only to its partner. As in the jay 
example (Fig. 1), freely behaving subjects played against stooges, but here 
they encountered either a unilateral altruist stooge (blue) or a unilateral 
defector stooge (red). Over all sessions, the tamarins pulled the tool for 
altruists much more frequently than for defectors, indicating that their 
cooperation was contingent on their partner’s cooperation. (Reprinted 
with permission from [23]. Copyright 2003 Royal Society of London). 
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Many psychologists consider the iterated Prisoner’s Di-
lemma to be an extension of the discounting problem [31, 
32]. Individuals can choose between the immediate reward 
of defecting or the long-term reward of cooperating. Exper-
imental data on variation in human discounting and coop-
eration validate this view. Discounting correlates with co-
operation such that individuals who highly devalue future 
rewards cooperate less frequently [33]. In parallel, blue jays 
show stable cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma when 
the discounting rate is lowered by allowing payoffs to ac-
cumulate over several trials (Figure 1; [22]). In summary, 
because reciprocity requires paying an immediate cost for 
future benefits, the expected future benefit must be time-
discounted appropriately for reciprocity to work.
Numerical discrimination
A challenge for reciprocal interactions lies in quantify-
ing the economics of the entities given and returned and 
evaluating whether the exchange was equitable. For exam-
ple, if an altruist gives four apples and receives one back, 
this is not equitable, and natural selection should eliminate 
this poor decision-maker from the population. Do animals 
count or quantify in these ways? If they do not, then either 
individuals are satisfied with some return, regardless of 
amount, or they are open to defectors giving back less than 
a fair amount.
Rats and pigeons can be trained to press a key a cer-
tain number of times for food. However, animals make 
more errors as the required number of presses increases 
(reviewed in [34]). When an experimenter requires a rat to 
press a key four times for food, it is usually exactly right, 
pressing four most of the time and on occasion pressing 
three or five times. By contrast, when the target num-
ber is 24, the rat sometimes presses 24 times, but often it 
presses somewhere between 20 and 30 times. These stud-
ies show that animals can quantify number, but only ap-
proximately so.
Studies of foraging in animals show that individuals 
attempt to maximize the rate of energetic returns, choos-
ing patches with more food over those with less [35]. 
As estimates of rates of return depend on quantifying 
amount of food consumed over time, we can ask whether 
animals count the pieces, estimate the volume, or time 
the foraging periods in a patch. When given a choice be-
tween two different numbers of food items, rhesus mon-
keys routinely choose the larger when both items are less 
than four, even when time and volume are controlled. 
Above four, however, the monkeys have difficulty dis-
criminating unless the difference between the two num-
bers is large [36].
Based on an overwhelming number of carefully con-
trolled experiments, it is now fair to say that animals have 
a number sense consisting of two naturally available sys-
tems [37]. One allows animals to count up to about four 
with precision; the second allows them to approximate 
large numbers. If animals engage in a bout of recipro-
cal altruism, they will either be limited to small numbers 
of objects in cases where the exchange must be precise (a 
banana for a banana), or they will be freed from this con-
straint where approximate exchanges are tolerated. Thus, 
when animals reciprocally exchange precise amounts of a 
resource, they must be able to quantify those amounts or 
they will be susceptible to cheaters.
Learning/memory
One of the primary alternative strategies to TFT is a 
learning-based strategy called win–stay/lose–shift or Pav-
lov [38]. This strategy is loosely based on Thorndike’s law 
of effect [39], in that when an individual receives reward-
ing payoffs (T or R), it will repeat that choice, but if it re-
ceives punishing payoffs (P or S), it will switch choices (see 
Box 2). Nowak and Sigmund conducted evolutionary sim-
ulations of an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and showed 
that Pavlov could emerge and remain stable in a stochas-
tic environment [38]. The stability of Pavlov, however, de-
pends on the actual values of T, R, P, and S. The threshold 
between rewards and punishments is critical in analyzing 
cooperative games [40]. If the threshold separates T and R 
from P and S, the Pavlov strategy can work well.
In some of the earliest experimental work on the Prison-
er’s Dilemma using human subjects, Rapaport and Cham-
mah [15] used negative payoffs for P and S and found rel-
atively high levels of cooperation. By contrast, subjects 
cooperate much less in experiments using non-negative 
payoffs [41]. Zero payoffs also have potential effects on 
cooperation. Stephens and Clements [40] tested blue jays 
in payoff matrices with S = 0 and S = 1. In both cases the 
jays dropped to low levels of cooperation; however, when 
S = 0 the jays dropped faster and to lower levels. There-
fore, the relationship between thresholds and payoffs in-
fluenced learning rates, which, in turn affected cooperative 
behavior.
Limitations in memory decay, interference and capac-
ity also constrain the frequency of reciprocity. Models of 
Figure 3. The discounting rate describes the steepness of the discount-
ing function—that is, how quickly the reward is devalued over time. The 
hyperbolic model of discounting is described by V = A/(1+kD), where V 
is the subjective value of the reward, A is the amount of the reward, D is 
the delay to reward, and k is a free parameter describing the discount-
ing rate. This discounting rate k has been estimated for pigeons and rats, 
suggesting that both species rapidly devalue food delayed in a matter of 
seconds [27, 28]. Similar experiments on humans suggest that we de-
value money at a much lower rate, on the order of months rather than 
seconds [29]. (Note that the Time delay axis has dual units. Discounting 
functions plotted from k values reported in Mazur [27], Richards et al. 
[28], and Rachlin et al. [29]).
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forgetting predict exponential or power functions [42], 
because memories decay rapidly over time. Therefore, 
longer time intervals between cooperative acts should 
make reciprocity more difficult. Time is not the only fac-
tor that potentially influences how memory interacts 
with cooperation. The presence of other types of com-
putationally intensive events also interferes with mem-
ory. Milinksi and Wedekind tested working memory con-
straints on humans playing iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
games [43]. Subjects played either a series of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games or a series of Prisoner’s Dilemma games 
separated by a game of Memory. Although the overall 
outcomes did not differ between the two treatments, the 
strategies used by the subjects did differ: subjects with-
out interference used memory-intensive Pavlov-like 
strategies, whereas subjects with interference used a gen-
erous version of TFT.
Related to the effect of interference on memory are ca-
pacity constraints. Even if the time between cooperative 
interactions is short and few distractions exist, every po-
tential new partner increases the computational load of 
tracking the debts owed and favors given. Keeping score 
of reciprocal obligations with multiple individuals can be 
a computationally intensive burden on memory. Although 
few studies examine learning and memory constraints in 
animal cooperation, human studies suggest that these con-
straints can pose challenges for maintaining stable cooper-
ative relationships. In summary, when the delay to recip-
rocation is long, both the donor and receiver are likely to 
forget the debt.
Conclusions and prospects
Cooperation is quite common in both human and non-
human animal societies [1]. We argue, however, that most 
instances of animal cooperation can be attributed to either 
selfish or indirect benefits via mutualism and helping kin. 
We suggest that reciprocal altruism among unrelated in-
dividuals is rare if not absent among animals, despite its 
ubiquity in humans. In cases where it occurs in the labo-
ratory, it is unclear whether the patterns observed would 
generalize to more natural and less controlled situations. 
We propose that cognitive constraints on temporal dis-
counting, numerical discrimination, learning and memory, 
and other components, limit the ability of many species to 
implement and maintain reciprocally altruistic strategies. 
If this is correct, then comparative research should illu-
minate which components are shared with other animals, 
which are unique to humans, and why certain components 
evolved in our species and no other.
In addition, this framework can guide research into 
the psychological capacities mediating cooperation. Spe-
cifically, we propose that investigations of reciprocity 
must first evaluate the limitations of animals in the cog-
nitive areas that we have described. What are the numer-
ical discrimination abilities, discounting rates, learning 
rates, and memory features of the species being investi-
gated? When testing reciprocity, researchers should con-
sider these constraints in designing appropriate exper-
iments. The next step is to compare these circumstances 
with naturally cooperative situations. Do natural coopera-
tive contexts fall within the range of the species’ cognitive 
abilities or are the constraints too restrictive to maintain 
reciprocity in the wild?
Another path into these cognitive problems is to look 
into the brain to search for neural correlates of cooperative 
behavior. Because there are no explicit studies of the neu-
robiology of cooperation in animals, we rely on neuroeco-
nomics—the neurobiology of economic decision making 
in humans—with the hope that it will shed some light on 
the possible neural correlates of social interactions in ani-
mals [44, 45]. As neuroeconomics is in its infancy, there is 
as yet no clear computational theory predicting how coop-
eration is processed and represented in the brain (but see 
[9]). However, if we can document the necessary and suf-
ficient circuitry underlying human cooperation and rec-
iprocity, then this will illuminate one way in which one 
species evolved this form of cooperation. Although other 
animals might solve this problem by means of other cir-
cuitry, if it turns out that animals are incapable of main-
taining reciprocally stable relationships, then understand-
ing which part of the circuitry is missing or deficient may 
help explain why.
The study of altruistic cooperation is clearly a cross-dis-
ciplinary endeavor, integrating behavioral ecology, evo-
lutionary biology, experimental economics, neurobiol-
ogy and psychology. Ultimately, understanding the nature 
of cooperation will require cooperation among these and 
other fields.
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